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SUMMARY: We use Chinese audit partner data to show that partners associated with financial reporting fraud
induce share price declines among non-fraudulent firms audited by the same audit partners. In cross-sectional
analyses, we find that share price declines are more pronounced when low-quality partners (LQPs) failed to issue
modified audit opinions during the period in question and when the LQPs were from one of the Top 10 audit firms.
Additional analyses show that investors impose larger penalties on contagion firms when fraudulent firms are larger
and the time lapse between sanction and fraud commitment is shorter. The personal characteristics of LQPs (except
gender) do not cause a difference in market reaction to contagion firms. Overall, our results speak to the importance
of audit partner identity to stock market valuation.
JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48.
Keywords: audit partner; audit quality; price contagion effects; market reactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
P
rior audit quality studies have largely focused on the audit firm or the city-based practice office. Recently, there have been
increasing calls for more research at the individual audit partner level to yield better insights into the auditing process
(DeFond and Francis 2005; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Lennox and Wu 2018). Responding to these calls, several studies have
moved to focus on audit quality issues at the individual audit partner level (Carcello and Li 2013; Gul, Wu, and Yang 2013; Knechel,
Vanstraelen, and Zerni 2015; Li, Qi, Tian, and Zhang 2017). For example, Gul et al. (2013) show that the effects of individual
auditors on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant. Knechel et al. (2015) suggest that different partners in the
same audit firm make audit judgments across audits on a systematic, nonrandom basis. More recently, Li et al. (2017) focus on audit
partners who have performed failed audits and find that these failed partners also deliver lower-quality audits on other engagements.
We extend prior studies by investigating how stock market investors react to non-fraudulent firms that share the same audit
partner with fraudulent companies. Following the literature, we define an audit partner as a low-quality partner (LQP) when one
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or more of his/her clients has been involved in financial reporting fraud.1 Prior studies have shown that the clients of audit
firms/offices that provide low-quality audits suffer significantly negative abnormal returns (Chaney and Philipich 2002; Weber,
Willenborg, and Zhang 2008). Because the audit office is often viewed as the primary decision-making unit of an audit firm
(Francis and Michas 2013; Francis and Yu 2009), investors may perceive audit failure to occur at the office level, thus driving
down the stock prices of all clients audited by the same office. Due to the non-availability of partner information in these prior
studies, there is a lack of in-depth analysis on whether investors perceive low audit quality to occur at the level of individual
auditors. While an expectation exists that stock market investors will react negatively to non-fraudulent firms that share an audit
partner with fraudulent companies, one further question that arises concerns the circumstances that could mitigate this effect.
Therefore, we explore whether the issuance of modified audit opinions (MAOs) to fraudulent companies by LQPs and whether
the LQPs were from Top 10 audit firms (proxies for audit quality) affect the stock market reaction to non-fraudulent companies
that share low-quality partners.
We conduct our analyses using the setting in the Chinese market, which has two important institutional features. The first
feature is that two auditors of each audit engagement are required to sign the audit report in China.2 The two signing auditors
are either partners or senior managers, and they play a similar role as engagement partners in the U.S. The second feature is that
listed companies that were involved in financial fraud can clearly be identified since the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) publishes the findings of fraud investigations on its official website. These fraud cases are similar to the
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) in the U.S. Therefore, the announcement dates of these reports
enable researchers to investigate market reactions to non-fraudulent firms audited by the same audit partner as the sanctioned
firms.
Our sample includes 327 sanction announcements associated with financial reporting fraud during the period 1999–2012.
These regulatory sanctions are against firms in China whose financial statements are challenged for accounting malfeasance. An
audit partner that audited a sanctioned firm during the years when financial reporting fraud occurred is identified as an LQP.3
We then examine market reactions to non-fraudulent firms audited by an LQP (defined as contagion firms) during fraud-
occurring years and the current year around sanction announcements.4 The five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are
significantly negative for contagion firms that are audited by an LQP compared to other firms. Our cross-sectional analysis
shows that the share price decline is significantly larger when LQPs failed to issue MAOs for the sanctioned firms during the
fraud period and when the LQPs were from the Top 10 audit firms. These results indicate that auditors are penalized more
heavily by the market when they fail to issue a warranted qualified report (Kida 1980; Kaplan and Williams 2013) and that
LQPs from the Top 10 audit firms suffer larger reputational losses.
We also conduct several additional analyses to shed light on factors that affect the price contagion effects. First, we find
that the price contagion effects of LQPs vary with the severity of financial reporting frauds measured by the size of the
fraudulent firm and the time lapse between the sanction announcement date and the period during which the fraud was
committed.5 Second, we find that price contagion effects are more pronounced for male LQPs than they are for female LQPs.
However, we do not find that price contagion effects vary significantly with other individual characteristics, such as an LQP’s
age, party membership, educational background, and audit experience.
Third, we compare market reactions to three groups of contagion firms: (1) firms that were audited by LQPs during both
fraud years and the current year, (2) firms audited by LQPs during fraud periods that changed to non-LQPs during the current
year, and (3) firms that were audited by LQPs only during the current year and not during the fraud years. Our results show that
market decline is the strongest for firms audited by LQPs during both periods. By comparison, the price contagion effect is
1 Two common definitions of audit failure exist. The first stream of research defines audit failure as when an auditor’s clients are involved in accounting
malfeasance, including restatement of earnings, fraud activity, or sanctions by the government. The second stream of research defines audit failure
narrowly as a situation in which an audit firm (or its partners) is sanctioned by the government, court judgments, or SEC enforcement actions. Our
definition of audit failure follows the first stream of studies, that is, we assume fraud in client firms suggests that the audit of the originally issued
financial statements was of unacceptably low quality. In addition, the use of accounting malfeasance can provide insight into a much wider range of
potentially low-quality audits than a narrower definition of audit failures (Francis and Michas 2013).
2 China’s Independent Auditing Standard (CIAS) requires that at least two auditors sign an audit report. In our sample, a small fraction of the reports (335
reports, about 1.5 percent) were signed by three auditors.
3 This definition also applies to low-quality audit offices and low-quality audit firms. We denote an audit office (firm) that audited a sanctioned firm
during the years when financial reporting fraud occurred as a low-quality audit office (firm) (LQAO; LQAF).
4 Fraud years are the periods in which clients committed fraud. The current year is the year before clients are sanctioned by CSRC. For example, if a firm
committed fraud in financial reporting between 1998 and 2000 and was subsequently sanctioned in 2002, the fraud years are 1998–2000 and the current
year is 2001.
5 Because of the complexity of fraudulent financial reporting and the lack of detailed information from sanction announcements (details to be provided in
Section II), determining the magnitude or type of fraud for each case is difficult. Therefore, we rely on the size of the fraudulent firm and time lapse
between the sanction announcement and the period during which the fraud was committed as indirect measures of fraud severity. We acknowledge that
the absence of direct measurement of the specific type and magnitude of a fraud sanction is a limitation of our findings.
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significantly attenuated when contagion firms change to non-LQPs during the current year, presumably due to a ‘‘fresh set of
eyes’’ provided by the incumbent auditors in the current year.
Fourth, we examine whether the price contagion effect is stronger for clients of LQPs who received direct sanctions from
the government as a result of their clients’ fraudulent reporting. We find no significant difference between market reactions to
non-fraudulent clients of LQPs with or without direct government sanctions, indicating that investors’ perceptions of
reputational loss are not limited to LQPs with partner sanctions but extend to LQPs not directly subjected to regulatory
sanctions. Fifth, we examine the market reactions of LQPs who were sanctioned once compared to those sanctioned more than
once. Although market reactions to firms audited by LQPs of first-time sanctions and LQPs of subsequent sanctions are all
negative and significant, the market appears to punish the former more severely. Finally, we find that the price contagion effect
exists when the LQP is either the engagement partner or the review partner, suggesting that investors perceive the audit quality
of both engagement and review partners to be equally bad when they are implicated in fraud.
In addition, we conduct a series of robustness tests, including the use of several alternative window periods for the market
reaction tests, excluding contagion firms located in the same region or belonging to the same business group as the sanctioned
firms, and controlling for the fixed effect of the individual audit partner. Our results continue to hold in all of these robustness
tests.
Our study complements two recent studies by Li et al. (2017) and Knechel et al. (2015). Li et al. (2017) focus on actual
audit quality as measured by abnormal accruals rather than on investors’ perceptions of audit quality. Furthermore, they do not
investigate the factors that influence investors’ perception of audit quality.6 Our finding is consistent with that of Knechel et al.
(2015), who show that the market recognizes and prices differences in engagement partner reporting style.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies that examine the price contagion effects of audit
failures typically focus on the audit firm or audit office (Chaney and Philipich 2002; Weber et al. 2008). We find that price
contagion effects also occur at the partner level. Our study complements prior research (e.g., Knechel et al. 2015; Aobdia, Lin,
and Petacchi 2015; Li et al. 2017) by providing further evidence that the availability of audit partners’ identities can assist the
capital market in making informed decisions on audit quality.
Second, our study complements and extends prior research (e.g., Li et al. 2017) by providing cross-sectional evidence that
the characteristics of LQPs can affect the extent of price contagion effects. Providing collective evidence on these important
issues will not only help practitioners, listed companies, and regulators better understand how the market perceives audit
quality but also represents a step forward in the development of auditing theory.
Third, as highlighted in Lennox and Wu (2018), endogeneity is a common problem for studies conducted at the partner
level because the client-partner alignment process is unlikely to be random.7 Given that assignments are determined
endogenously, it is unclear whether the documented results are driven by the characteristics of the partner or the characteristics
of the clients to which the partner is assigned. This problem is more acute when measures of financial reporting quality, such as
accruals, are used to capture audit quality (Aobdia et al. 2015; Li et al. 2017) because financial reporting quality is a joint
product of the interaction between the firm and its auditor. In our study, such endogeneity is less of a concern because
regulatory sanctions against fraudulent firms are likely to be exogenous to non-fraudulent firms. Consequently, market reaction
tests are less likely to suffer from endogeneity problems as long as stock prices already impound all publicly available
information.
Several limitations are inherent in our study. First, although we show that price contagion effects occur at the partner level,
we are unable to conclude from our research design whether partner-level effects subsume office-level effects or whether both
effects exist. Second, we interpret negative reactions to non-fraudulent firms audited by LQPs as market perceptions of
partners’ low audit quality based on the assumption that investors know the non-fraudulent firms’ underlying value. However,
the market may also adjust the true value of clients upon announcements of fraud. Our research design, however, cannot
disentangle the two. Last, due to the complexity of frauds and the lack of information from sanction announcements, we could
not directly measure the magnitude and type of sanctions associated with LQPs.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we review the literature and present the research hypotheses. In Section
III, we describe the research design and sample. In Section IV, we present the empirical results. We conclude the paper in the
final section.
6 In their review paper, DeFond and Zhang (2014, 288) summarize that perception-based measures capture audit quality more comprehensively than
actual output measures. This is especially important in China as studies have found that Chinese-listed companies can manage earnings, other than
abnormal accruals, with related-party transactions, government subsidies, and asset restructuring (Aharony, Lee, and Wong 2000; Chen, Lee, and Li
2008; Jian and Wong 2010).
7 As noted in Lennox and Wu (2018), the evidence in Chen, Peng, Xue, Yang, and Ye (2016) shows that clients prefer more lenient partners when they
shop for clean audit opinions. Hence, the match between the client and partner can be endogenous to the partner’s past audit style and to the riskiness/
preferences of the client.
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II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Background of the Chinese Audit Market
The Chinese audit market provides an appropriate setting for analyzing our research questions for several important
reasons. First, China’s auditing standards require that engagement auditors sign the audit reports and disclose the related
information to the public. Typically, two engagement auditors sign each audit report, with the more senior signing auditor
mainly performing the review work and the relatively junior signing auditor mainly administering the fieldwork (Gul et al.
2013).8 This arrangement provides the identity of the individual auditors.
Second, we use regulatory sanctions against firms for accounting malfeasance to infer the low audit quality of the partner
that audits sanctioned firms.9 Accounting malfeasance typically includes a combination of misstatement of revenue, income, or
assets that materially change the financial position of a firm.10 China’s Securities Law gives the CSRC the authority to sanction
firms and individuals suspected of securities and financial reporting fraud. The CSRC conducts both regular reviews and
random inspections of listed companies. It also receives complaints from public sources such as investors, employees, and
newspapers, all of which can lead to regulatory investigations. The findings of the CSRC investigations and sanction decisions
are announced publicly on an official website with some detailed information regarding fraudulent firms’ wrongdoing.11
Internal warnings are issued for minor violations, and stronger punishments, including suspension of trading, withdrawal of
licenses, civil penalties, and criminal prosecution, are enforced for material malpractice (Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui 2006).
Generally, there is a time lag between sanction announcements and the occurrence of financial reporting fraud. Based on our
data, an average of 1.9 years is required for financial reporting fraud to be uncovered.
Third, the Chinese audit market is suited to investigating partner reputational effect in terms of market value loss following
financial reporting fraud because it is characterized by low investor protection, low litigation risk for auditors (Chen, Sun, and
Wu 2010; Wang, Yu, and Zhao 2015), and a less developed legal and institutional structure than that found in more developed
countries (Chen et al. 2006). Investors are likely to be more sensitive about audit quality because they are not well protected by
laws and consequently, their investments will shrink when firms are implicated in financial fraud. In China, auditors are
unlikely to be a source of insurance for investors. In a large number of fraud cases, angry investors launched numerous
lawsuits, but no payouts were provided by audit firms (Hutchens 2003). Moreover, fierce competition in the Chinese audit
market exacerbates the reputational consequences of poor audit quality (Chen et al. 2010). In the U.S. and other developed
countries, the Big 4 firms audit the majority of listed companies, whereas in China, the percentage of listed companies audited
by the Big 4 auditors is only approximately 26 percent (Chen, Su, and Wu 2007).12
Audit Partners and Audit Quality
While prior research on audit quality largely focuses on the audit firm (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks
1999) or branch office (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009; Reynolds and Francis 2000) level, a recent trend in auditing research suggests
that examination of the audit process at the engagement partner and team personnel level will yield better insights into the auditing
process.13 Knechel (2000) argues that individual audit partners differ in terms of incentives, risk preferences, expertise, and
8 Audit reports in China are predominantly signed by two partners: the review partner and the engagement partner. Following Lennox, Wu and Zhang
(2014), we define the first signature partner as the review partner because the name of the review partner is disclosed in the audit report above the name
of the engagement partner.
9 These regulatory sanctions are similar to the AAERs in the U.S. Prior studies use AAERs as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting that indicates
audit failure (e.g., Bonner, Palmrose, and Young 1998; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Lennox and Pittman 2010). Our definition of a low-quality audit is
broader than that of Li, Qi, Tian, and Zhang (2017) and Aobdia, Lin, and Petacchi (2015), who consider only a sanctioned partner as low-quality. In
contrast, we view the audit quality of partners whose clients are being sanctioned as low regardless of whether the partners are being sanctioned by
regulators.
10 For example, on December 21, 2004, Hefei Fengle Seed Co., LTD was sanctioned by the CSRC for financial reporting fraud during 1997–2002. Three
major issues are involved in this case of fraud: (1) the company failed to disclose significant security investment outflows and inflows during 1997–
2001, (2) the company inflated revenues and expenses during 1997–2001 to increase profits and presented the fictitious assets on the balance sheet
during 1997–2002, and (3) the company provided misleading information about the use of raised funds. This information is publicly disclosed at http://
www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306212/200804/t20080418_14421.htm
11 Although the reports provide some quantitative information on accounting fraud (e.g., how much revenues were inflated, how much assets or expenses
are underestimated), the information is incomplete and does not allow us to summarize the net impact on income, complicating the comparison of fraud
magnitude across firms.
12 The number of audit firms qualified to audit listed companies has declined over time because of mergers and acquisitions. However, since the number
of partners has increased more than the number of listed firms, partner level competition remains as fierce as before. On average, the number of clients
per audit partner was 2.80 and 2.37 in year 2000 and 2012, respectively. Consequently, such a buyer’s market is likely to afford clients more bargaining
power and impose pressure on auditors fighting for their slice of the pie (Chen, Su, and Wu 2007). A senior partner from KPMG in China also
informally confirmed that the Chinese auditing market remains very competitive.
13 Lennox and Wu (2018) provide a comprehensive review of the prior literature on audit partners.
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cognitive abilities, which ultimately affect audit quality. Using audit data in the Chinese market, Gul et al. (2013) document
substantial variation in audit quality across different partners. Using data from Taiwan, Aobdia et al. (2015) report that the identity
of individual audit partners provides informational value to capital market participants beyond the value provided by the identity
of the audit firms. Knechel et al. (2015) find that companies audited by an individual partner, even in different industries, tend to
exhibit similar levels of aggressiveness or conservativeness in audit reporting over time. This implies that while audit quality
varies across the spectrum of audit partners, there appears to be consistency in the quality of their performance.
In addition to documenting the consistency of partners’ reporting style across different engagements in prior literature,
other studies have investigated the impact of audit partners’ characteristics and incentives on audit outcomes. For example,
Goodwin and Wu (2016) document that auditors are less likely to issue first-time going-concern opinions and are associated
with lower audit quality as they age. Zerni (2012) finds that engagement partner industry specialization is associated with
higher fees for some partners. Chin and Chi (2009) show that accounting restatements are less likely to occur when partners
have greater industry expertise. Several other studies have also investigated factors that motivate partners to provide different
levels of audit quality, including clients’ economic importance to the audit partner (Chen et al. 2010; Chi, Douthett, and Lisic
2012), audit partner tenure (Carey and Simnett 2006; Chen, Lee, and Li 2008; Ye, Carson, and Simnett 2011), audit partner
workload (Sundgren and Svanstro¨m 2014; Goodwin and Wu 2016), and social ties or economic bonding between audit
partners and their clients (Blouin, Grein, and Rountree 2007; Guan, Su, Wu, and Yang 2016).
Price Contagion Effects of Low-Quality Audits
Prior research on information transfer theory typically examines the share price contagion effect of information releases by
one firm on other firms, usually in the same industry. For example, prior studies document the presence of price contagion
effects for earnings announcements (Foster 1981), earnings forecasts by management (Han, Wild, and Ramesh 1989),
bankruptcy announcements (Lang and Stulz 1992), and accounting restatements (Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson 2008), among
others. Information transfer occurs when news released by one firm affects the stock prices of other firms. Specifically,
information, or news, about one reporting entity (e.g., accounting fraud) can affect investors’ reactions to different reporting
entities with similar characteristics.
Building on the above information transfer literature, an audit failure is likely to cause investors to reevaluate their
positions owing to the increased uncertainty associated with the audit quality of other firms audited by the same auditor.
Therefore, when an audit failure is publicized, other clients of the same audit firm experience a significant loss of market value
(Chaney and Philipich 2002; Weber et al. 2008; Cahan, Emanuel, and Sun 2009; Huang and Li 2009; Skinner and Srinivasan
2012). Francis and Michas (2013) show that the existence of low-quality audits in an auditor office indicates the presence of a
contagion effect on the quality of other (concurrent) audits conducted by the same office, indicating that audit failure is a
systematic problem with audit quality at the affected office location. Overall, the prior studies suggest that the contagion effect
exists at both the audit firm level and the office level.
We extend these prior studies by studying the price contagion effects at the individual audit partner level. Research on
information transfer suggests that information from an announcing firm is useful for investors in updating their expectations of
similar information on other firms that share some common characteristics with the announcing firm. We conjecture that
financial fraud in a firm can cause investors to perceive the audit quality of a partner to be low when his/her clients are being
sanctioned by regulators owing to financial reporting concerns. Recent research also suggests that the stock market appears to
recognize the audit quality of the audit partner. For example, Knechel et al. (2015) find that the market penalizes firms audited
by partners with a history of aggressive GCO or accrual reporting through higher implicit interest rates, lower credit ratings, and
higher assessed insolvency risks. Moreover, clients of auditors with aggressive reporting are associated with lower Tobin’s Q.
Aobdia et al. (2015) find a positive association between individual audit partners’ quality and earnings response coefficients,
suggesting that investors perceive earnings to be more informative when a higher-quality partner performs the audit. They also
find that the market reacts positively when firms switch from a lower-quality partner to a higher-quality partner and that firms
audited by higher-quality partners experience a lower level of underpricing when they go public.
We define the audit quality of audit partners as low if their clients were involved in financial reporting fraud sanctioned by
the CSRC. A sanction announcement conveys a negative connotation about both the fraudulent firm’s underlying true value
(Titman and Trueman 1986) and the perceived quality of the audit partner (Dye 1993). Investors of non-fraudulent firms
audited by the same partner lower their expectations of audit quality and perceive an increased risk of discovering similar
financial reporting issues. The share prices of these firms are thus likely to decrease. Such a drop in share prices is consistent
with the notion that the audit quality problem is perceived to be shared by all firms audited by the same partner.14
14 We assume that investors know non-fraudulent firms’ underlying true value and that value does not change with a sanction announcement. Therefore,
negative reactions to other firms audited by LQPs are likely driven by perceived low audit quality. However, investors may also adjust firms’
underlying value downward independent of the perceived audit quality. Our research design does not allow us to separate the two.
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However, the contagion effect may not occur at the individual partner level. Audit partners are constrained by the quality
control mechanisms within an auditing firm or office. They must follow auditing standards and the standardized audit
procedures, and key decisions are often centralized at the audit firm/office level (Gul et al. 2013). If investors believe that an
audit firm/office has strong internal control, then the fraud committed by one client firm does not necessarily affect other clients
of LQPs. Thus, a priori, it is unclear whether the price contagion effect of financial reporting fraud resides at the individual
partner level. Because of this ambiguity, we state our first hypothesis in null form:
H1: There is no significant difference in the share price decline for non-fraudulent firms audited by LQPs compared with
the benchmark firms.
Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Price Contagion Effects
We expect that the price contagion effect, if it exists, will be stronger in instances in which the LQP’s reputation is likely to
be severely tarnished. We consider two factors related to the attributes of the LQP: whether the LQP issued an MAO to
fraudulent firms and whether the LQP was from one of the Top 10 audit firms.
Auditors can mitigate their risk exposure by issuing MAOs. Several studies find that auditors increase their issuance of MAO
to clients with higher litigation risk (Kaplan and Williams 2013) and to clients with larger accruals (Francis and Krishnan 1999).
The issuance of MAOs, particularly to financially distressed clients prior to bankruptcy, lowers alleged audit failure, auditor
litigation, and litigation settlements (Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Kaplan and Williams 2013). Further, Kida (1980) reports that
audit partners believe that failure to issue an audit opinion when it is warranted is ‘‘grounds for alleging auditing negligence.’’
Hence, an individual audit partner that failed to issue MAOs to sanctioned firms indicates lower audit quality because the audit
partner either could not detect the fraud or did not report the problem. Consequently, we expect that audit partners that issued
MAOs will alleviate investors’ concerns about individual auditors’ quality, leading to a less pronounced price contagion effect.
However, prior studies show that whether investors can clearly differentiate the content of MAOs from clean opinions is
unclear. For example, Chow and Rice (1982) find no significant market reaction to MAOs, whereas Choi and Jeter (1992)
report negative price reactions to MAOs. Using Chinese market data, Chen, Su, and Zhao (2000) find that investors did not
react negatively to MAOs in the year of issuance. Their study suggests that two to three years were required for investors to
form a consensus belief about the implications of MAOs on the informativeness of earnings. Therefore, whether the issuance of
MAOs by LQPs will affect investors’ perception is an empirical question. We state the hypothesis in null form as follows:
H2: The price contagion effect is not dependent on whether LQPs issued an MAO for the sanctioned firm.
We also expect LQPs from Top 10 audit firms to affect the price contagion effect. Top 10 auditors are generally perceived
to be of high-quality in China (Fang, Pittman, Zhang, and Zhao 2017). For example, Top 10 auditors are more likely to issue
MAOs to firms with questionable accounting practices (DeFond, Wong, and Li 1999), are less likely to be subject to political
influence or political connections (Chan, Lin, and Mo 2006; Yang 2013), are associated with higher market valuation of
earnings (Gul, Sun, and Tsui 2003), and facilitate the flow of more credible firm-specific information into the stock market
(Gul, Kim, and Qiu 2010). We therefore expect less price contagion for clients audited by Top 10 firms. However, if the
investors expect high-quality audits from the partners of large audit firms to begin with, the very fact that their audit clients are
sanctioned would send a negative shock to investors, resulting in a more negative market reaction. Thus, it is not clear ex ante
whether the Top 10 audit firms can reduce or enhance the price contagion effect, and we do not offer a directional prediction.
Based on the above discussion, we formulate our hypotheses as follows:
H3: The price contagion effect is not dependent on whether LQPs were from the Top 10 audit firms.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE
Empirical Model
In H1, we test whether the price contagion effect, measured in terms of market reactions of non-fraudulent firms to
sanctions, exists at the individual audit partner level. In particular, we examine market reactions to non-fraudulent firms audited
by an LQP during fraud years and/or the current year.15 To be comparable with prior studies, we also examine market reactions
15 In additional tests, we further separate contagion firms into three subgroups: firms that share the same audit partner as sanctioned firms in the fraud
years but not in the current period (34 percent), firms that share the same audit partner as sanctioned firms in the current period but not in the fraud
periods (15 percent), and firms that share the same audit partner as sanctioned firms in both the fraud and current periods (51 percent). We find that the
price contagion effect exists in all three subgroups.
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to non-fraudulent firms that were audited by the office/firm in which the LQP is located. Accordingly, we identify four distinct
groups of non-fraudulent firms around sanction announcements: (1) firms audited by an LQP; (2) firms audited by an LQAO
(the office in which the LQP is located); (3) firms audited by an LQAF (the audit firm in which the LQP is located); and (4)
non-contagion firms audited by a different audit firm. Specifically, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions:
CAR ¼ b0 þ b1LQP þ b2SIZEþ b3LEV þ b4MTBþ b5ROAþ b6LARGEST þ b7ABS DAþ b8TOP10 þ b9N LINKS
þ b10N LAPSEþ b11SIZEsanction þ b12CARsanction þ Year=Industry=Audit Office Fixed-Eff ectsþ e
ð1Þ
where CAR represents firms’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the corresponding sanction announcement date (2,
þ2), where date 0 represents the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the
announcement.16 Daily abnormal returns are calculated as a firm’s raw returns minus the same-day weighted adjusted returns of
the market in which the firms are listed.17 LQP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if at least one of the partner’s client firms
was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem and 0 otherwise. We provide an example of how we code LQP in Appendix
A. Price contagion effects at the partner level exist if the coefficient estimate of LQP is significantly negative.
We include a wide array of controls based on prior studies that may potentially affect the stock returns around the sanction
announcements. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B. All control variables, except CARsanction,
are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the sanction announcement date. We control for firm size (SIZE) since larger firms
are subject to closer scrutiny by investors, and this greater capital market pressure will heighten investors’ concerns over the
contagion firms’ financial reporting quality that will likely exacerbate the price contagion effect (Gleason et al. 2008; Chen and
Goh 2013). Consistent with Gleason et al. (2008), we control for the effect of leverage (LEV), firm performance (ROA), and
growth (MTB) on observed stock price reactions to informational events. Because large shareholders have a significant
influence on the financial reporting process in China (Gul et al. 2010; Yu, Zhang, and Zheng 2015), we include the largest
shareholder’s ownership (LARGEST) to capture the shareholder’s monitoring role in the financial reporting process in China.
Gleason et al. (2008) find that restatement-induced contagion stock returns are correlated with measures of accounting quality.
Thus, we control for the earnings quality (ABS_DA) of contagion firms and non-contagion firms prior to the sanction
announcement date. We also control for the quality of the audit firm (TOP10) that audits the sample firms; the number of years
that the firm was audited by LQPs, LQAOs, or LQAFs (N_LINKS); and the number of years that have elapsed since the last
fraud year to the year of sanction (N_LAPSE).
Following Gleason et al. (2008), we include sanctioned firms’ CARs surrounding the sanction announcement date
(CARsanction) to control for differences in investor perceptions of the severity and importance of the sanction and related
information in the announcement, as the magnitude of the information transferred by the event firm affects the degree of
spillover (Yu et al. 2015). We also control for the size of the sanctioned firms (SIZEsanction) because larger firms are more likely
to provoke greater contagion effects than small firms (Chen and Goh 2013). Finally, we include a set of indicator variables that
represent the year, industry, and audit office to control for year, industry, and audit office fixed effects.18
To test H2 and H3, we include the moderating variables (MAO and Top10sanction) and their interactions with LQP in
Equation (1). Consistent with Huang, Raghunandan, Huang, and Chiou (2015) and He, Pittman, Rui, and Wu (2017), we
define MAO as one of the following: (1) unqualified opinions with explanatory notes, (2) qualified opinions, and (3)
adverse opinions.19 TOP10sanction is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP was from the Top 10 audit firms during
the fraud period and 0 otherwise.20 The coefficients of interest in H2 and H3 are LQP3MAO and LQP3 TOP10sanction,
respectively.
16 Consistent with Yu, Zhang, and Zheng (2015), we use (2,þ2) as the window period. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of window periods. We
report the results using different window periods in the robustness checks.
17 There are two stock markets in China: the Shenzhen stock market and the Shanghai stock market. The market returns used to calculate CARs are the
market in which the firms are listed.
18 The industry classification is based on CSRC two-digit codes for non-manufacturing industries and three-digit codes for manufacturing industries. Our
results continue to hold when we remove the office fixed-effect from the regressions.
19 Huang et al. (2015) and He et al. (2017) also include a disclaimer in their definitions of MAO. We do not include a disclaimer because none of the
sanctioned firms were issued a disclaimer during the fraud periods in our sample. Although the CICPA interprets unqualified opinions with explanatory
notes in a manner similar to the ‘‘emphasis of matter’’ in U.S. GAAS, this type of audit report is often issued in lieu of a qualified opinion in China.
Previous China-based studies all treat it as a form of audit opinion modification (e.g., DeFond et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2010; Huang et al. 2015; He et al.
2017).
20 In our main regression model, we control for TOP10, the quality of audit firms that audit the contagion and non-contagion firms in the year before the
sanction announcement date. By comparison, TOP10sanction controls for the quality of the audit firm that audits sanctioned firms during the fraud
period.
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Sample Selection
The original regulatory sanction sample comprises all regulatory sanction events suspected of financial reporting frauds
from 1999 to 2012 collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.21 As shown in Panel
A of Table 1, the sample starts with 411 sanction events.22 Data on individual audit partner and stock returns are also collected
from the CSMAR database. We delete observations if stock returns around the sanction announcement date are not available
(51 events), if audit partners are unidentifiable (20 events), or if fraudulent firms’ audit partners have no other clients (11
events). Finally, we exclude two sanctions that involve firms in the financial industry. Our final sample includes 327 regulatory
sanctions announcements (involving 275 unique firms) associated with financial reporting fraud during our sample period.23
Contagion Firms with a Common Audit Partner, Common Audit Office, Common Audit Firm, and Non-Contagion
Firms
Panels B and C of Table 1 provide sample selection procedures for contagion firms and non-contagion firms. We define a
firm as a contagion firm through a common audit partner (common audit office or firm) if the firm was audited by the same
individual audit partner (the same audit office or the same audit firm) as the sanctioned firms during the financial reporting fraud
periods and current period. As shown in Panel B, we first identify 21,654 observations as contagion firms through a common
audit firm. We then delete 1,142 observations that have insufficient stock returns data, 150 observations that belong to the
financial industry, and 2,413 observations that have other public disclosures surrounding the sanction announcements.24 We
impose the last requirement to enhance our ability to detect sanction-induced stock price contagion and avoid confounding
effects due to the announcements of other public information. Our final sample includes 2,421 firm-year observations with
common audit partners. Among those, 10,606 (17,949) observations with common audit offices (firms) are included.
Panel C of Table 1 provides the sample selection of non-contagion benchmark firms. For each sanction, we identify non-
contagion benchmark firms as those in the same industry as the sanctioned firm but that neither report fraud nor share the same
audit firm as the sanctioned firms.25 Since the total number of firms in different industries is different, ranging from 16 to 504,
we further restrict benchmark firms to be no more than 60 firms with the closest size as the sanctioned firm.26 We obtain 17,592
matched observations. We delete 1,343 observations that have insufficient stock returns data and 1,493 firms that had another
public disclosure during the sanction announcement period. Our final sample for the non-contagion firms is 14,756. In the price
contagion effect test, we use all 32,705 (17,949 þ 14,756) contagion and non-contagion firm observations in the empirical
analysis. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Gul et al. 2013), we obtain data on control variables such as financial data, stock return
data, and ownership information from the CSMAR database. We discard 3,104 observations with missing data for the control
21 The CSMAR database covers all kinds of corporate scandals of listed Chinese firms. They can be classified into five categories: (1) financial reporting
fraud, misstatement of revenue, income, assets, or other items that materially change the financial position of a firm; (2) incomplete, late or lagging
information disclosure or information concealment; (3) corruption or others; (4) insider trading or market manipulation; and (5) other administrative
violations, irregularities, and other crimes. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Yu et al. 2015), we define the first category as sanctions related to financial
reporting fraud.
22 We manually check each of the sanction announcement dates from multiple data sources, including public announcements released by the listed firms,
the CSRC, stock exchanges, and news reports in China’s major business and finance newspapers. When there is more than one date related to the same
fraud sanction, we employ the earliest one as the announcement date to calculate CARs in price contagion tests. For all 411 sanction events in our
study, we corrected 84 (20 percent) announcement dates compared to the information acquired from the CSMAR database. Although we take steps to
ensure that the announcements represent ‘‘new’’ information to the capital markets, some information leakage may occur before the sanction
announcement dates. To alleviate this concern, we compute the CARs of sanctioned firms for preannouncement dates (10, 3). The mean CAR is
0.14 percent, which is not significantly different from 0. The result suggests that sanction announcements likely represent new information and no
evidence of information leakage before the announcement date.
23 We also compare the characteristics of sanctioned firms and non-sanctioned (i.e., contagion and non-contagion) firms during the sample period. The
univariate analysis shows that the sanctioned firms are significantly smaller (t¼ 7.76), less profitable (t¼ 13.04), less likely to be audited by Top 10
audit firms (t ¼ 3.67), and less likely to be state-owned (t ¼ 5.30).
24 We exclude observations in which other public information was announced during the sanction announcement period (day2 to dayþ2). Other public
information includes earnings release, earnings warnings, de-listing, suspension of listing, annual reports, quarterly reports, special treatment (ST), and
particular transfer (PT).
25 With these criteria imposed for selecting non-contagion benchmark firms, the CARs of non-contagion firms actually capture the price contagion effect
of the same industry. (Gleason et al. 2008). Ex ante, it is unclear if the price contagion effect of a common low-quality partner will be greater or smaller
than the price contagion effect of the same industry.
26 We take two approaches to mitigating the selection bias of the non-contagion firms. First, we use a propensity-score procedure to find the non-
contagion firms. The probability of a firm being sanctioned in a given year is estimated based on firm size, turnover, loss, operating cash flow, the
issuance of a modified audit opinion and whether the firm is audited by a Top 10 audit firm. After obtaining the propensity scores, we match each
treatment firm with 60 non-contagion firms with the closest propensity scores as the set of non-contagion benchmark firms. Second, to further ensure
that our results are not caused by the selection bias for non-contagion firms, we restrict the sample firms to include only the contagion firms. Our
inferences remain, indicating that that our results are not affected by the selection of non-contagion firms.
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variables. The final observations in the price contagion test are 29,601, as shown in Panel D of Table 1. We winsorize all
continuous variables at the bottom and top one percentile to mitigate the undue influence of outliers.
In Table 2, Panels A and B present the distribution of sanctioned, contagion, and non-contagion firms based on the
sanction announcement year and industry, respectively. The sanctions are not evenly distributed across the years. For example,
78 sanctions are announced in 2012, the largest number during our sample period. We present observations of the three types of
contagion firms separately.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE PRICE CONTAGION EFFECT TEST
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the price contagion test. The distribution of
these variables is comparable to that in prior studies (e.g., Gul et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2015). The mean of LQP is 0.0748,
indicating that 7.48 percent of observations are contagion firms with the same LQP as the sanctioned firms.
TABLE 1
Sample Selection Procedure
Panel A: Sanctions Selection
Number of sanctions between 1999 and 2012 411
Less: number of sanctions that
Have insufficient stock returns data 51
Have no information about individual audit partners 20
Have no shared individual audit partners with other firms 11
Are in the financial industry 2
Number of sanction observations in our sample (275 unique firms) 327
Panel B: Contagion Firms
Number of observations that are matched with the above 327 sanction observations through
common low-quality audit firm
21,654
Less: number of matched observations that
Have insufficient stock returns data 1,142
Are in the financial industry 150
Have other public information disclosures 2,413
Number of contagion observations in our sample 17,949
Contagion firms with common low-quality partners 2,421
Contagion firms with common low-quality audit offices 10,606
Contagion firms with common low-quality audit firms 17,949
Panel C: Non-Contagion Firms
Number of observations that are matched with the above 327 sanctions in the same industry
and of similar firm size
17,592
Less: number of matched observations that
Have insufficient stock returns data 1,343
Have other public disclosures 1,493
Number of non-contagion observations in our sample 14,756
Panel D: Sample for Price Contagion Model (for H1)
Contagion firms and non-contagion firms (17949 þ 14756) 32,705
Less:
Observations with insufficient data to calculate control variables 3,104
Number of observations in the price contagion model 29,601
This table provides details of our sample construction in the price contagion tests. Panels A, B, and C describe the sample selection procedures for the
sanction sample, contagion firm sample, and non-contagion firm sample, respectively. Panel D presents the final sample for the price contagion tests.
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In Panel B of Table 3, we report the mean and median of CARs for a variety of window periods for contagion and non-
contagion firms, separately. The results are consistent across different CARs. We focus our discussion on the five-day CAR
from day2 to day 2 (CAR (2,þ2)) since this is the window we use to test our hypothesis. The mean and median CAR (2,
þ2) are 0.56 percent and 0.86 percent for contagion firms with common LQP; 0.12 percent and 0.57 percent for
contagion firms with a common audit office but not with a common LQP;0.08 percent and0.46 percent for contagion firms
with a common audit firm but without a common LQP or audit office; and0.23 percent and0.59 percent for non-contagion
TABLE 2
Sample Description
Panel A: Distribution of Sanctioned Firms, Contagion Firms and Non-Contagion Firms by Year
Year
All
Listed
Firms
Sanctioned
Firms
Contagion
Firms
With LQP
Contagion
Firms
With LQAO
Contagion
Firms
With LQAF
Non-Contagion
Firms
1999 927 5 35 66 66 220
2000 1,062 5 39 100 100 235
2001 1,140 14 89 254 273 627
2002 1,204 28 219 495 623 1,154
2003 1,268 20 181 441 523 831
2004 1,356 26 218 654 864 1,252
2005 1,352 20 137 433 571 889
2006 1,435 15 137 311 472 650
2007 1,549 15 85 377 578 618
2008 1,603 15 83 354 468 686
2009 1,752 27 202 1,011 1,325 1,286
2010 2,107 24 235 872 1,295 1,075
2011 2,336 35 236 1,607 2,311 1,621
2012 2,385 78 525 3,631 8,480 3,612
Total 21,476 327 2,421 10,606 17,949 14,756
Panel B: Distribution of Sanctioned Firms, Contagion Firms and Non-Contagion Firms by Industry
Industry
All
Listed
Firms
Sanctioned
Firms
Contagion
Firms
With LQP
Contagion
Firms
With LQAO
Contagion
Firms
With LQAF
Non-Contagion
Firms
Agriculture 508 2 73 203 371 514
Exploring 391 3 28 143 266 145
Manufacturing 13,060 154 1,506 6,625 11,300 9,296
Utilities 789 4 76 300 482 179
Construction 441 4 52 234 397 112
Transportation 811 10 65 330 523 343
Technology 1,495 28 138 819 1,427 1,310
Commerce 1,368 11 156 613 1,015 632
Properties 667 17 84 347 584 460
Services 663 43 72 308 501 462
Media 189 12 19 76 163 13
Conglomerate 1,094 39 152 608 920 1,290
Total 21,476 327 2,421 10,606 17,949 14,756
This table provides information on the sample distribution by year and by industry. Panel A and Panel B show the distribution of all listed firms, the
sanctioned firms, contagion firms, and non-contagion firms by year and industry, respectively. Four distinct groups of firms are used in the analysis: (1)
firms audited by low-quality partners (LQPs), which we denote as contagion firms with LQPs; (2) firms audited by low-quality audit offices, which we
denote as contagion firms with LQAOs (this group of firms also includes contagion firms with LQPs); (3) firms audited by low-quality audit firms, which
we denote as contagion firms with LQAFs (this group of firms also includes contagion firms with LQPs and contagion firms with LQAOs); and (4)
benchmark firms with the same industry and similar firm size as the corresponding sanctioned firms, which we denote as non-contagion firms. For reasons
of brevity, industry is classified using one digit.
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firms, respectively. The negative market reaction of non-contagion firms is consistent with the intra-industry information
transfer documented in Gleason et al. (2008).
Panel C of Table 3 reports the univariate tests of differences in mean and median between contagion firms with an LQP
with the other three groups of firms. The difference in the CARs of contagion firms with an LQP from contagion firms with an
LQAO but not an LQP (and those with an LQAF but not an LQP or LQAO) is statistically significant, indicating that negative
market reaction to contagion firms with a common audit partner is more severe than that to other contagion firms. We also find
that market reaction to contagion firms with an LQP is significantly more negative than that to non-contagion firms. These
results suggest that the stock price decline for the contagion firms that share at least one common audit partner with the
sanctioned firm is greater than that of benchmark firms.
Main Analysis
We report the results for testing H1 in Table 4. We first re-examine the firm and office-level price contagion effects in the
first two columns. LQAF (LQAO) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if at least one client firm was sanctioned for an
TABLE 3
Univariate Analysis of the Price Contagion Effects
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics in Price Contagion Model (n ¼ 29,601)
Variables Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev.
CAR (2,þ2) 0.0015 0.0057 0.0270 0.0190 0.0526
LQP 0.0748 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2630
LQAO 0.3230 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4680
LQAF 0.5510 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4970
SIZE 21.3700 21.2200 20.6700 21.9400 1.0480
LEV 0.5380 0.5070 0.3150 0.6970 0.3350
MTB 2.5330 1.8280 1.3390 2.8730 2.3970
ROA 0.0405 0.0371 0.0120 0.0711 0.0770
LARGEST 36.7600 34.4900 24.4300 47.9200 15.4900
ABS_DA 0.0596 0.0421 0.0187 0.0800 0.0607
TOP10 0.4350 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4960
N_LINKS 0.4640 0.6930 0.0000 0.6930 0.4980
N_LAPSE 0.4860 0.0000 0.0000 0.6930 0.5500
SIZEsanction 20.9084 20.7881 20.3026 21.6021 1.0136
CARsanction 0.0024 0.0070 0.0393 0.0218 0.0662
This panel presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the price contagion model. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in Appendix
B. The number of observations is 29,601 except for SIZEsanction and CARsanction, which are based on 327 sanctioned firms.
Panel B: Market Reaction for Contagion Firms and Non-Contagion Firms Around Sanction Announcements
Variable
(1)
Contagion Firms
with LQP
n ¼ 2421
(2)
Contagion Firms
with LQAO
(without LQP)
n ¼ 8185
(3)
Contagion Firms
with LQAF
(without LQP or LQAO)
n ¼ 7343
(4)
Non-Contagion Firms
n ¼ 14756
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
CAR (1, þ1) 0.30%*** 0.46%*** 0.09%** 0.39%*** 0.04% 0.33%*** 0.11%*** 0.39%***
CAR (2, þ2) 0.56%*** 0.86%*** 0.12%** 0.57%*** 0.08% 0.46%*** 0.23%*** 0.59%***
CAR (2, þ3) 0.63%*** 0.74%*** 0.14%** 0.61%*** 0.07% 0.55%*** 0.28%*** 0.65%***
CAR (2, þ5) 0.53%*** 0.89%*** 0.16%** 0.71%*** 0.12%* 0.62%*** 0.32%*** 0.80%***
CAR (2, þ10) 0.63%*** 1.38%*** 0.31%*** 1.14%*** 0.23%*** 0.91%*** 0.55%*** 1.25%***
CAR (2, þ30) 1.07%*** 2.17%*** 0.94%*** 2.24%*** 0.56%*** 1.95%*** 1.17%*** 2.35%***
(continued on next page)
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accounting-related problem and 0 otherwise. In column (1), we find that the coefficient for LQAF is non-significant.27 In
column (2), the coefficient for LQAO is negative and significant, suggesting the existence of an office-level contagion effect as
documented in prior studies (e.g., Chaney and Philipich 2002; Francis and Michas 2013). Column (3) presents the result for H1
regarding whether the price contagion effect occurs at the individual partner level. The coefficient for LQP is negative and
statistically significant at 1 percent, indicating that the price contagion effect occurs at the individual partner level. In terms of
economic significance, the CARs are 0.5 percent lower for contagion firms that share common partners with the sanctioned
firms than those for benchmark firms. This magnitude represents a 33 percent (¼ 0.5/1.5) reduction in CARs from the sample
mean CARs (Table 3, Panel A).
For the set of control variables, the coefficients on LEV and MTB are positive and significant, suggesting that contagion
stock returns are higher for firms with higher growth opportunities and leverage. The significant and positive coefficient on
CARsanction indicates that contagion stock returns are highly correlated with stock returns of sanctioned companies. In
particular, more negative news released in financial fraud sanctions leads to a more severe information spillover to other firms.
The coefficient on ABS_DA is marginally significant and negative, which provides some evidence that contagion firms with
lower accounting quality suffer a more severe price contagion effect. Other variables, however, are not statistically significant at
the conventional levels.
Overall, our results in Table 4 suggest that the sanction announcements induce stock price declines among the contagion
firms owing to investors’ concerns over the low quality of audit partners. The price contagion effect occurs at the audit partner
level, suggesting that the identification of audit partners provides information to the capital market in addition to information
from audit offices and audit firms.28
Cross-Sectional Analysis
We provide the results for testing H2 and H3 in Table 5. In column (1), the coefficient for LQP3MAO is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that the price contagion effect at the individual audit partner level is less
pronounced when the audit partners issue MAOs to sanctioned firms. In column (2), the coefficient on LQP3 TOP10sanction is
TABLE 3 (continued)
Panel C: Univariate Analysis in Market Reactions
Variable
Contagion Firms in (1)
versus
Contagion Firms in (2)
Contagion Firms in (1)
versus
Contagion Firms in (3)
Contagion Firms in (1)
versus
Non-Contagion Firms in (4)
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
CAR (1, þ1) 2.58*** 1.96* 3.21*** 2.90*** 2.41** 1.59
CAR (2, þ2) 4.38*** 3.32*** 4.61*** 4.18*** 3.35*** 2.52**
CAR (2, þ3) 4.40*** 3.13*** 4.82*** 3.87*** 3.18*** 2.02**
CAR (2, þ5) 2.86*** 2.45** 3.14*** 3.21*** 1.67* 1.33
CAR (2, þ10) 1.94* 1.74* 2.41** 2.66*** 0.50 0.38
CAR (2, þ30) 0.50 0.38 1.94* 2.04** 0.39 0.45
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the samples used in the price contagion test. All continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1
percentile to mitigate the undue influence of outliers. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in Appendix B. Panel B reports the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) in different intervals. CAR is calculated as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market return on the corresponding
day. Day 0 is the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. Panel C reports test statistics (t-
value for mean and z-value for median) for differences in the CARs between the contagion firms with common partner and contagion firms with common
audit office but without common partner, between contagion firm with common partner and contagion firms with common audit firm but without common
partner or audit office, or between contagion firms with common partner and non-contagion firms.
27 One possible explanation for the non-significant coefficient for LQAF is that the contagion effect through the same audit firm is no greater than the
contagion effect through the same industry since the non-contagion firms were selected from the same industry as the sanctioned firms.
28 Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 show that both office and individual level contagion effects exist. One limitation of our setting is that we cannot
determine whether price contagion effects at the office level co-exist with the price contagion effects at the partner level since all the variation in LQAO
is subsumed by the variation in LQP.
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significantly negative at the 5 percent level, indicating that the price contagion effect is more pronounced when the LQPs were
from Top 10 audit firms. This result is consistent with the interpretation that LQPs of Top 10 audit firms are penalized more
heavily if their clients are sanctioned for poor financial reporting.
In Table 6, we separately examine the moderating effect of each type of audit opinion (unqualified opinions with
explanatory notes, qualified opinions, and adverse opinions) on the price contagion effects. Our results show that the
coefficients for LQP3MAO_emphasis and LQP3MAO_adverse are positive and significant at the convention level, while the
TABLE 4
Results for the Price Contagion Effects of Low-Quality Partners
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1) (2) (3)
LQP 0.005***
(4.796)
LQAO 0.002**
(1.993)
LQAF 0.000
(0.291)
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.167) (0.154) (0.137)
LEV 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(2.909) (2.901) (2.918)
MTB 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(5.133) (5.149) (5.139)
ROA 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.279) (0.288) (0.246)
LARGEST 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.467) (3.441) (3.416)
ABS_DA 0.010* 0.010 0.010*
(1.647) (1.643) (1.652)
TOP10 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.575) (0.623) (0.483)
N_LINKS 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.275) (0.319) (0.501)
N_LAPSE 0.000 0.001 0.001*
(0.003) (1.575) (1.821)
SIZEsanction 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.731) (0.746) (0.795)
CARsanction 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(2.774) (2.803) (2.732)
Constant 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.523) (0.487) (0.418)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,601 29,601 29,601
Adjusted R2 1.7% 1.8% 1.8%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table presents the results for the following regression: CAR ¼ b0 þ b1LQP LQAO; LQAFð Þ þ b2SIZEþ b3LEV þ b4MTBþ b5ROAþ b6LARGEST
þ b7ABS DAþ b8TOP10þ b9N LINK þ b10N LAPSEþ b11SIZEsanction þ b12CARsanction þ Year=Industry=Audit Office Fixed Eff ectsþ e
The dependent variable is the firms’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the corresponding sanction announcement date (2,þ2), where date 0
represents the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. The daily abnormal return is calculated
as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market return on the corresponding day. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in Appendix
B. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering. We report two sets of results. Model (1) is the regression with LQAF. Model (2) is the
regression with LQAO. Model (3) is the regression with LQP.
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coefficient for LQP 3 MAO_qualified is positive but non-significant. These results suggest that the issuance of unqualified
opinions with explanatory notes and adverse opinions can mitigate investors’ concerns about LQPs.
To summarize, our cross-sectional analyses show that price contagion effects are more pronounced when (1) LQPs failed
to issue MAOs on the sanctioned firms; and (2) LQPs were from the Top 10 audit firms, which is consistent with the notion that
investor reactions are more negative when more severe damage to a partner’s reputation is sustained.
TABLE 5
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Price Contagion Effects for H2 And H3
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
Mod_Var ¼ MAO
(2)
Mod_Var ¼ TOP10sanction
LQP 0.007*** 0.003**
(5.549) (2.196)
LQP 3 Mod_Var 0.005*** 0.004**
(2.713) (1.972)
Mod_Var 0.002*** 0.000
(2.625) (0.571)
SIZE 0.000 0.000
(0.115) (0.412)
LEV 0.005*** 0.005***
(2.915) (2.957)
MTB 0.032*** 0.031***
(5.150) (4.938)
ROA 0.000 0.000
(0.241) (0.089)
LARGEST 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.429) (3.640)
ABS_DA 0.010 0.008
(1.640) (1.363)
TOP10 0.001 0.000
(0.407) (0.032)
N_LINKS 0.000 0.001
(0.734) (0.794)
N_LAPSE 0.001* 0.001
(1.826) (1.452)
SIZEsanction 0.000 0.000
(0.886) (0.850)
CARsanction 0.014*** 0.015**
(2.632) (2.558)
Constant 0.003 0.002
(0.263) (0.175)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 29,601 29,601
Adjusted R2 1.8% 3.0%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table reports the cross-sectional analysis results of the price contagion effects for H2 and H3. The dependent variable is the firms’ five-day cumulative
abnormal returns around the corresponding sanction announcement date (2,þ2), where date 0 represents the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a
trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. Daily abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market
return on the corresponding day. We extend Equation (1) by adding the interaction between LQP and the following moderating variables (Mod_Var): (1)
Modified Audit Opinion (MAO) and (2) TOP10sanction, and the results are presented in column (1) and column (2), respectively. Detailed definitions of the
variables are outlined in Appendix B. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering.
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Further Analyses
Fraud Severity and Price Contagion Effects
We explore how fraud severity affects price contagion effects. We include two moderating variables, the size of the
sanctioned firm (LARGE_SANC) and the time lapse between the sanction announcement date and fraud-committed period (N_
LAPSE), and their interactions with LQP in Equation (1). LARGE_SANC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the size of the
corresponding sanctioned firm is greater than the median size of sanctioned firms and 0 otherwise. N_LAPSE is the natural log
of 1 plus the number of years that have elapsed since the last fraud year to the year of sanction.
The results are reported in Table 7. The coefficient for LQP3 LARGE_SANC is significantly negative at the 10 percent
level, suggesting that the price contagion effect is more pronounced for larger sanctioned firms. Furthermore, we find that the
coefficient on LQP3N_LAPSE is significantly positive at the 10 percent level, indicating that the price contagion effect is less
pronounced when the time lapse between the sanction announcement date and fraud period is longer.
Individual Characteristics and Price Contagion Effects
In this section, we explore whether the price contagion effects vary with LQPs’ individual characteristics. Following Gul et
al. (2013), we identify several demographic characteristics, including gender, age, party membership, educational background,
audit experience, and number of audit engagements conducted. Panel A of Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for these
characteristics, and Panel B reports the results based on the individual characteristics of LQPs. Overall, the results indicate that
the price contagion effects are more pronounced for male LQPs than for female LQPs, but price contagion effects do not vary
significantly with LQPs’ age, party membership, educational background, or audit experience.
TABLE 6
Further Analysis on Different Types of MAO in H2
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQP 0.007***
(5.347)
LQP 3 MAO_emphasis 0.005*
(1.867)
LQP 3 MAO_qualified 0.004
(1.621)
LQP 3 MAO_adverse 0.012**
(2.421)
MAO_emphasis 0.003
(0.984)
MAO_qualified 0.009
(0.974)
MAO_adverse 0.009
(1.457)
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 29,601
Adjusted R2 3.4%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table reports the result for the effect of different audit opinion types on the price contagion effects of low-quality partners in H2. The dependent
variable is the firms’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the corresponding sanction announcement date (2,þ2), where date 0 represents the
day of a sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. Daily abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s raw
return minus the weighted adjusted market return on the corresponding day. MAO_emphasis (MAO_qualified; MAO_adverse) is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the sanctioned firm was issued an unqualified opinion with explanatory notes (qualified opinions; adverse opinions) during the fraud period and
0 otherwise. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in Appendix B. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering.
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Alternative Specification of LQPs
We provide additional analyses on how alternative specifications of LQPs may affect the price contagion. First, in the main
tests of the price contagion effect, we define contagion firms with LQPs as the firms audited by LQPs from the fraud periods
and current period (defined as one year before the sanction announcement date). For completeness, we further separate the
contagion firms with LQPs into three groups: (1) firms audited by LQPs during the fraud periods but not the current period
TABLE 7
Effect of Fraud Severity on an LQP’s Price Contagion Effect
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1) (2)
Mod_Var ¼ LARGE_SANC Mod_Var ¼ N_LAPSE
LQP 0.003** 0.008***
(2.018) (4.527)
LQP 3 Mod_Var 0.004* 0.003*
(1.884) (1.825)
Mod_Var 0.001 0.000
(0.609) (0.569)
SIZE 0.000 0.000
(0.335) (0.617)
LEV 0.005*** 0.005***
(2.790) (3.270)
MTB 0.031*** 0.031***
(5.042) (5.234)
ROA 0.000 0.000
(0.033) (0.040)
LARGEST 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.615) (3.271)
ABS_DA 0.008 0.010*
(1.329) (1.732)
TOP10 0.001 0.001
(0.841) (1.543)
N_LINKS 0.001** 0.001
(2.050) (1.299)
N_LAPSE 0.000
(0.559)
SIZEsanction 0.000 0.000
(0.123) (0.864)
CARsanction 0.014*** 0.016***
(2.623) (2.795)
Constant 0.013 0.004
(0.949) (0.327)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 29,601 29,601
Adjusted R2 2.7% 1.3%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table reports the results for the effect of fraud severity on LQPs’ price contagion effects. The dependent variable is the firms’ five-day cumulative
abnormal returns around the corresponding sanction announcement date (2,þ2), where date 0 represents the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a
trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. Daily abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market
return on the corresponding day. We extend Equation (1) by adding the interaction between LQP and the following moderating variable (Mod_Var): (1)
LARGE_SANC; (2) N_LAPSE, and the results are presented in column (1) and column (2), respectively. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in
Appendix B. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering.
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(LQPfraud¼ 1); (2) firms audited by LQPs in the current period but not during the fraud period (LQPcurrent¼ 1); and (3) firms
audited by LQPs during both the fraud and current periods (LQPboth_periods¼1). We replace LQP with LQPfraud, LQPcurrent and
LQPboth_periods in equation (1). We show the descriptive statistics of all alternative specifications of LQP for the contagion firms
sample in Panel A of Table 9. We report the re-estimation results in Panel B. All three indicator variables regarding LQPs are
significantly negative, suggesting that our results of a price contagion effect are not driven by any specific period definition. In
addition, we compare the differences in the magnitudes of coefficients among the LQP indicators. F-tests show that the
coefficient on LQPboth_periods is significantly more negative than that on LQPfraud at the 5 percent level. This result suggests that
the price contagion effect is significantly attenuated when the contagion firms change LQPs during the current period,
presumably due to a ‘‘fresh set of eyes’’ brought in by incumbent auditors in the current period. The coefficients on LQPfraud
and LQPcurrent or the coefficients on LQPboth_periods and LQPcurrent are not significantly different from each other.
Next, we examine whether the price contagion effect is stronger for LQPs who received a direct sanction from the
government that is attributable to clients’ fraudulent reporting. In the 327 firm sanction events, there are 53 cases in which
individual audit partners were sanctioned. We separate the LQPs into two types: LQPs where both client and partner were
sanctioned (53 cases) and LQPs where only the client was sanctioned (274 cases). Specifically, we define LQPpartnersanction as
an indicator variable that equals 1 if that specific partner was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem for all years
covering the sanction period and 0 otherwise. LQPfirmsanction as an indicator variable that equals 1 if at least one of that partner’s
client firms was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem for all years covering the sanction period and 0 otherwise. We
report the results in Table 9, Panel C. The coefficients on LQPpartnersanction and LQPfirmsanction are both significant, and the result
of the F-test shows that there is no significant difference in magnitude between these two coefficients (F-statistics¼ 0.21). The
result suggests that investors perceived the audit quality of partners to be low, regardless of whether they are being sanctioned
or not, so long as their clients are being charged of accounting malfeasance.
We also investigate whether a differential effect in price contagion exists between LQPs identified for the first time and
LQPs identified for subsequent sanctions. LQPfirst (LQPnot_first) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a partner of contagion
firms is identified as a low-quality partner (not) for the first time and 0 otherwise. We find that 30.8 percent of unique LQPs are
identified more than once due to clients’ sanctions, and 50.93 percent of the contagion firms are considered associated with
TABLE 8
Individual Characteristics and Price Contagion Effects
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
LQP Non-LQP Difference
Female
Mean 0.2451 0.3346 5.287***
Median 0.0000 0.0000 5.281***
Age
Mean 38.8622 38.0715 3.064***
Median 38.0000 37.0000 3.310***
CCP_Member
Mean 0.3182 0.2502 4.268***
Median 0.0000 0.0000 4.265***
Master_Degree
Mean 0.1826 0.1437 3.006***
Median 0.0000 0.0000 3.005***
Accounting_Major
Mean 0.7748 0.7835 0.556
Median 1.0000 1.0000 0.556
Audit Experience
Mean 8.6348 8.6832 0.212
Median 9.0000 8.0000 0.880
Number of Clients
Mean 3.1536 2.1668 18.050***
Median 2.0000 2.0000 13.582***
(continued on next page)
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these LQPs with multiple sanctions. We report the results in Panel D. Although the coefficients for both LQPfirst and LQPnot_first
are negative and significant, the result of the F-test shows a significant difference in magnitude between the two coefficients (F-
statistic ¼ 2.89), indicating that the market punishes LQPs identified for the first time more severely.
Audit reports in China disclose the names of both the review partner and engagement partner, and in most cases, the two
partners share the same legal liability (Lennox et al. 2014). In our fourth specification of LQPs, we investigate whether a
differential effect exists between low-quality review partners and low-quality engagement partners in the price contagion test.
LQPreview (LQPengagement) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the review (engagement) partner of contagion firms is of low
TABLE 8 (continued)
Panel B: Regression Results for Effects of LQPs’ Personal Characteristics on Price Contagion Effects
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LQPfemale 0.003
(1.313)
LQPmale 0.005***
(4.069)
LQPold 0.004***
(2.654)
LQPyoung 0.005***
(3.236)
LQPparty 0.004**
(2.118)
LQPnonparty 0.005***
(3.442)
LQPmaster 0.007***
(2.758)
LQPnonmaster 0.004***
(3.095)
LQPmajor 0.004***
(3.396)
LQPnonmajor 0.007***
(2.607)
LQPmore_exp 0.003**
(2.177)
LQPless_exp 0.006***
(3.834)
LQPmoreclients 0.005***
(3.116)
LQPlessclients 0.005***
(3.924)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,183 29,183 29,112 29,111 29,042 28,978 29,601
Adjusted R2 1.8% 1.8% 2.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table reports the results for the effects of LQPs’ personal characteristics on price contagion effects, including gender, age, party membership, master’s
degree, accounting major, and auditing experience. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the personal characteristics of individual audit partners.
Panel B reports the regression results for price contagion effects after separating the LQPs into two groups based on the personal characteristics above. The
dependent variable is the firms’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the corresponding sanction announcement date (2, þ2), where date 0
represents the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. Daily abnormal return is calculated as
a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market return on the corresponding day. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in Appendix B.
The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering.
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quality but the engagement (review) partner is not of low quality and 0 otherwise; whereas LQPboth_partners is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if both the review and engagement partners are of low quality and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in
Panel D of Table 9. The coefficients on all three indicator variables are all significantly negative, indicating that investors react
to the low quality of the review partner, engagement partner, or both.29
TABLE 9
Alternative Specification of LQPs for the Price Contagion Test
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for The Contagion Firms Sample
Variables n Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev.
LQPfraud 2,213 0.3371 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4728
LQPcurrent 2,213 0.1464 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3536
LQPboth_periods 2,213 0.5165 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4998
LQPpartnersanction 2,213 0.0944 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2925
LQPfirmsanction 2,213 0.9056 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2925
LQPfirst 2,213 0.4907 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000
LQPnot_first 2,213 0.5093 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000
LQPreview 2,213 0.4876 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5000
LQPengagement 2,213 0.2061 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4046
LQPboth_partners 2,213 0.3064 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4611
Panel B: Different Types of Contagion Firms with LQPs
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQPfraud 0.003*
(1.816)
LQPcurrent 0.004*
(1.824)
LQPboth_periods 0.007***
(5.440)
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 29,601
Adjusted R2 0.9%
Panel C: Contagion Firms with Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned LQPs
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQPpartnersanction 0.006*
(1.949)
LQPfirmsanction 0.005***
(4.482)
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 29,601
Adjusted R2 1.8%
(continued on next page)
29 Our F-tests show no significant differences between any pair of partner indicator variables.
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Robustness Tests
Expanded window periods for the price contagion test. In our main analysis, we use CARs (2, þ2) to measure the
market reaction of the sanction announcements. We also use alternative window periods to test robustness of our results.
Following Aobdia et al. (2015), we use CARs in the alternative windows including (1,þ1), (1,þ2), (2,þ3), (2,þ5) and
(1,þ10). We report the results in Panel A of Table 10. The coefficients on LQP in all specifications are significantly negative,
indicating that our main inferences remain unchanged with these alternative window periods.
Excluding contagion firms in the same location or same business group. We examine whether our results regarding the
price contagion effect still hold after excluding contagion firms located in the same location or contagion firms belonging to the
same business group. It is possible that the sanction-induced stock price decline is driven by the contagion firms located in the
same region as the sanctioned firms or the contagion firms belonging to the same business group as the sanctioned firms. We
report the results of this sensitivity check in Panel B of Table 10. In column (1), we drop the contagion firms with the same
location (province) as the corresponding sanctioned firms. In column (2), we redefine the non-contagion firms as firms with the
TABLE 9 (continued)
Panel D: Contagion Firms with First-Time Sanctioned and Non-First-Time Sanctioned LQPs
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQPfirst 0.007***
(4.730)
LQPnot_first 0.003**
(2.301)
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 29,601
Adjusted R2 2.7%
Panel E: Contagion Firms with a Low-Quality Review Partner, Engagement Partner, or Both
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQPreview 0.004***
(2.925)
LQPengagement 0.005***
(2.666)
LQPboth_partners 0.006***
(3.534)
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 29,601
Adjusted R2 1.8%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table presents the results on how alternative specifications of LQPs may affect the price contagion. All control variables are not tabulated for
parsimony. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the main independent variables. Panel
B reports the results for different contagion firms with an LQP during the fraud period, during current period or during both of periods. Panel C reports the
results for LQPs sanctioned or not sanctioned by regulators. Panel D reports the results for LQPs who are sanctioned for the first time versus those who are
not sanctioned for the first time. Panel E reports the results for different contagion firms with a low-quality review partner, with a low-quality engagement
partner, or with both LQPs.
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same industry and same location (province) as the sanctioned firms and rerun the regression.30 The coefficients on LQP in
column (1) and column (2) are both significant and negative, indicating that our results are not driven by price contagion effect
TABLE 10
Robustness Checks
Panel A: Alternative Windows for the Price Contagion Effects
Variables
(1)
[1,þ1]
(2)
[1,þ2]
(3)
[2,þ3]
(4)
[2,þ5]
(5)
[2,þ10]
LQP 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004**
(3.263) (4.388) (5.183) (3.176) (2.577)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,601 29,601 29,601 29,601 29,601
Adjusted R2 1.5% 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 2.3%
Panel B: Excluding Contagion Firms with the Same Location and Business Group as the Sanctioned Firms
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
Exclude
Contagion Firms
in the Same Location
as that of
Sanctioned Firms
(2)
Non-Contagion Firms
in the Same Industry
and Location
as that of
Sanctioned Firms
(3)
Exclude
Contagion Firms in
Same Business Group
as that of
Sanctioned Firms
LQP 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(3.267) (4.032) (4.553)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,429 16,497 29,319
Adjusted R2 2.0% 3.1% 1.8%
Panel C: Controlling for Partner Fixed Effects
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQP 0.005***
(4.777)
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Partner Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 29,601
Adjusted R2 7.4%
(continued on next page)
30 During the matching process, we were not able to find matched firms for some of the sanctioned firms (90 out of 327) in the same industry and same
province. We therefore dropped those sanctioned firms and corresponding contagion firms from the analysis. This explains the reduced sample size in
column (2).
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in the same location. In column (3), we exclude the contagion firms in the same business group as the corresponding sanctioned
firm. The significant and negative coefficient on LQP suggests that the price contagion effect at the individual audit partner
level is not driven by the contagion firms from the same business group as the sanctioned firms.
Control for partner fixed effects. Although we control for a battery of variables in our regressions, we may have omitted
some important individual audit partner characteristics that are associated with price contagion. Therefore, we include partner
fixed effects in the price contagion test to control for time invariant partner attributes such as expertise and experience. The
results, reported in Panel C of Table 10, are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the price contagion effect at the individual
audit partner level is not driven primarily by partner attributes.
Reduced contagion sample that includes only sanctioned firms with negative CARs. In our main analysis, we use all
sanctioned firms related to financial reporting fraud to identify low-quality auditors, including audit partners, audit offices, and
audit firms because prior studies (e.g., Chiu, Teoh, and Tian 2013; Francis and Michas 2013) suggest that earnings management
contagion through common audit offices or board interlocks reflect a systemic problem regardless of how the earnings
management is recognized by the capital market. In our last sensitivity check, we use a reduced contagion sample following
Gleason et al. (2008) and restrict the sample to contagion firms associated with sanction announcements with negative CARs.
Specifically, we identify auditors associated with sanctioned firms whose CARs around the sanction announcement dates are
negative as low-quality.31 We repeat all our tests and report the results in Panel D of Table 10. The results indicate that the
stock returns contagion through LQPs, captured by the coefficients on LQP, is negative and significant.
Other robustness checks. We conduct a number of other robustness checks, which are not tabulated for brevity. First, we
compare the contagion effects in state-owned firms (SOEs) versus non-state-owned firms (Non-SOEs). We identify four LQP
types based on whether the sanction firms and contagion firms are SOEs or Non-SOEs. We find significantly negative market
reactions for all situations. The results suggest that investors are concerned about audit quality in both SOEs and Non-SOEs.
Second, we examine the contagion effects within the same industry and across industries. We separate LQP into two types
based on whether the sanction firm and contagion firm are from the same industry or different industries. We find that the
contagion effects of LQPs exist both within the same industry and across different industries.
TABLE 10 (continued)
Panel D: Contagion Firms of the Sanctioned Firms with Only Negative CARs
Variables
Dependent Variable ¼ CAR (2, þ2)
(1)
LQP 0.005***
(3.716)
Controls Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 18,827
Adjusted R2 2.4%
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table reports the results for robustness checks. Panel A presents results with expanded window periods to test robustness of the results. We use CARs
in the window periods including (1,þ1), (1,þ2), (2,þ3), (2,þ5), and (2,þ10). Panel B presents results after excluding other types of possible price
contagion effects. Model (1) is the regression results after dropping observations with the same location (province) as the corresponding sanctioned firms.
Model (2) is the regression where we define the benchmark firms (non-contagion firms) with the same industry and same location as the sanctioned firms.
Model (3) is the regression results after dropping observations with the same business group as the corresponding sanctioned firms. The sample size for
this model is much smaller because we delete the sanction events without benchmark firms (non-contagion firms) owing to industry and location
restrictions. Panel C reports the results when we repeat all our price contagion tests after controlling for partner fixed effects. Panel D reports the results
when we identify low-quality partners (LQPs) associated with the sanctioned firms with negative CARs around the sanction announcement date. The
regression models are as described in the footnotes of the previous tables. All control variables are not tabulated for parsimony. The t-statistic in
parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering.
31 Among the 327 sanction events used in our main analysis, 206 sanctions have negative CARs and 121 have positive CARs. The main reasons for the
positive market reactions are confounding events. To identify the likely source of positive sanction announcement stock returns, we examine the 10
events with the largest positive five-day abnormal returns (mean returns of 17.66 percent, with a range from 11.83 percent to 26.08 percent). Generally,
these firms released some favorable information before the sanction announcement, such as a rights offering, asset restructuring, potential for an
acquisition, or specific measures to improve corporate governance. We include these sanctions with positive CARs in the main analysis because the
confounding events should not affect the contagion and non-contagion firms.
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Third, we remove sanction firms when there are important announcements concurrent with the sanction announcement.
Twenty-five sanction firms experienced other public information disclosures on earnings release, earnings warning, delisting,
suspension of listing, annual reports, interim reports, quarterly reports, special treatment (ST), or particular transfer (PT) during
the (2, þ2) window. All of our results hold after excluding 1,544 contagion firms associated with these announcements.
Fourth, we remove the 78 sanctioned firms from 2012 to alleviate the concern that our results are driven by an unduly large
number of sanctions in 2012 (Table 2, Panel A). Our results remain after removing the observations associated with sanctions
in 2012.
Fifth, our sample period ranges from 1999 to 2012, which overlaps with two important regulatory reforms, split share
structure reform (SSSR) in 2005 and the approval of new accounting standards in 2007.32,33 Our sample period also covers the
2008 financial crisis. To mitigate the concern that our results are driven by these special events, we re-estimate the regressions
separately in each of these different time periods, i.e., pre- and post-SSSR, pre- and post-new accounting standards and pre- and
post-financial crisis period. We find that price contagion effects exist in all periods, suggesting that contagion effects are not
driven by any regulatory change or financial distress.
Finally, we repeat our main tests after excluding LQPs with less than two clients and examining the price contagion effects
separately in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Our results remain in these two alternative settings.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper examines whether stock price contagion effects exist for low-quality audits of individual audit partners. We use
the clients sanctioned by the Chinese government for financial reporting fraud to identify LQPs and investigate whether market
valuation of contagion firms is affected by the identification of LQPs associated with regulatory sanctions. Our findings suggest
that such sanctions induce a significant stock price decline among the contagion firms that share the same LQPs. Additionally,
we find that the price contagion effects of LQPs are more pronounced when the LQPs failed to issue an MAO during the fraud
period and when the sanctioned firms were audited by Top 10 audit firms during the fraud periods. Our additional tests reveal
that the price contagion effects of LQPs are more pronounced when the sanctioned firm is larger and when the time lapse
between sanction announcement date and fraud period is shorter. We find that the price contagion effects are more pronounced
for male LQPs than they are for female LQPs, but we find no differences for other LQP characteristics such as age, educational
background, and audit experience. We find a significant price contagion effect regardless of whether the LQPs are directly
sanctioned by the government or whether the LQPs are engagement or review partners.
Our study is subject to some limitations due to data availability and the empirical design. First, we cannot conclude
whether an office-level contagion effect co-exists with a partner level contagion effect. Second, we are unable to determine
whether the negative market reactions of LQPs are due to perceived low quality of partners or a downward adjustment of the
contagion firms’ underlying true value. Last, due to data limitations and the complexity of fraudulent transactions, we could not
directly measure the impacts of the magnitude and type of sanctions associated with LQPs.
Despite the above caveats, our paper has important policy implications. Apart from the real economic consequences of
low-quality audits by partners, this paper has implications for regulators around the world that have already mandated or still
consider disclosing individual partner information in financial reports. Our study suggests that the identification of an audit
partner is valued by the capital market. The implication of the current study is that the disclosure of the identity of an individual
engagement partner would likely, via the stock market, help in enforcing accountability and in enhancing auditor quality.
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APPENDIX A
An Example of Key Variable Coding and Contagion Firms
We provide an example of how we code the key variables of an LQP (LQAO and LQAF). On the 27th of July in 2004,
TONTEC Technology Co., Ltd (the stock code is 600862) was sanctioned by the CSRC for financial reporting frauds during
1999–2001. According to the CSRC announcement, the company manipulated revenues and inflated profits, resulting in
17.17 percent cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the sanction announcement date. In this example, the fraud years
are 1999–2001, and the current year is 2003.
For the fraudulent periods in the years 1999–2001, the company’s auditing firm/office/partners were as follows. In the year
1999, the company was audited by the Tianjin Xinde CPA firm, Shenzhen Office, Dongxin LI and Zhicheng LIU. In the year
2000, TONTEC was audited by Tianjin Xinde CPA, Shenzhen Office, Changru GAN and Renyan ZHUANG; in the year 2001,
TONTEC was audited by Tianhua Dapeng CPA, Nanjing Office, Hongqing CHEN and Xianzhi GAO. The table summarizes
the above information:
Fraud
Occurring
Year Audit Firm Audit Office Audit Partners
1999 Tianjin Xinde CPA firm Shenzhen Office Dongxin LI and Zhicheng LIU
2000 Tianjin Xinde CPA firm Shenzhen Office Changru GAN and Renyan ZHUANG
2001 Tianhua Dapeng CPA firm Nanjing Office Hongqing CHEN and Xianzhi GAO
Thus, in this case, we identify 2 low-quality audit firms: Tianjin Xinde CPA and Tianhua Dapeng CPA; 2 low-quality audit
offices: Tianjin Xinde CPA, Shenzhen Office and Tianhua Dapeng CPA, Nanjing Office; 6 LQPs: Dongxin LI, Zhicheng LIU,
Changru GAN, Renyan ZHUANG, Hongqing CHEN, and Xianzhi GAO. Based on the identification of these low-quality
auditors, we identify contagion firms audited by LQPs in the fraud years and in the current year. In 1999, Dongxin LI audited
another two firms: Harbin Hatou Investment Co., Ltd (600864), and SDIC Power Holdings Co., Ltd (600886). In 2000,
Changru GAN audited two firms in addition to TONTEC: COFCO Property Co., Ltd (000031), and Shenzhen Airport Co., Ltd
(000089). In the current year 2003, Changru GAN audited another two firms: Shenzhen Expressway Company Limited
(600548) and Shenzhen Guangju Energy Co., Ltd (000096). Therefore, we have 6 contagion firms with the LQP for the
sanctioned firm TONTEC, for which the variable LQP of these 6 observations will be coded as 1. The coding for LQAO and
LQAF is the same as for LQP.
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APPENDIX B
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
CAR The five-day CARs around sanction announcements for non-sanction contagion firms and non-contagion firms.
Daily abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market return on the
corresponding day.
Variables of Interest
LQP An indicator variable that equals 1 if either that company’s specific partner or at least one of that partner’s other
client firms was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem and 0 otherwise.
LQAO An indicator variable that equals 1 if either that company’s audit office or at least one of that audit office’s other
client firms was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem and 0 otherwise.
LQAF An indicator variable that equals 1 if either that company’s audit firm or at least one of that audit firm’s other
client firms was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
SIZE Natural log of a client firm’s total assets.
LEV The client’s total liabilities, scaled by total assets.
MTB The client’s market value of equity, scaled by book value of equity.
ROA The client’s net income, scaled by total assets.
LARGEST The client’s largest shareholder’s ownership.
ABS_DA The absolute value of the residual from the regression models in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005).
TOP10 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by a Top 10 audit firm and 0 otherwise. The definition of
a Top 10 audit firm is based on the ranking of total client size in a specific year.
N_LINKS The natural log of 1 plus the number of years in which the clients were audited by LQPs, low-quality audit
offices, or low-quality audit firms.
N_LAPSE The natural log of 1 plus the number of years that have elapsed since the last fraud year to the year of sanction.
SIZEsanction Natural log of the sanctioned firm’s total assets.
CARsanction The CARs of sanctioned firms over a five-day window (2, þ2) that spans the day of first announcement for
sanction.
MAO An indicator variable that equals 1 if the sanctioned firm was issued a modified audit opinion during the fraud
period and 0 otherwise.
MAO_emphasis An indicator variable that equals 1 if the sanctioned firm was issued an unqualified audit opinion with explanatory
notes during the fraud period and 0 otherwise.
MAO_qualified An indicator variable that equals 1 if the sanctioned firm was issued a qualified audit opinion during the fraud
period and 0 otherwise.
MAO_adverse An indicator variable that equals 1 if the sanctioned firm was issued an adverse audit opinion during the fraud
period and 0 otherwise.
TOP10sanction An indicator variable that equals 1 if the sanctioned firms were audited by a Top 10 audit firm during the fraud
period and 0 otherwise.
LARGE_SANC An indicator variable that equals 1 if the size of sanctioned firm is greater than the median size of sanctioned
firms and 0 otherwise.
LQPfraud An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a contagion firm that shares at least one common partner with a
sanctioned firm during the fraud period but not during the current period, which is the year before the sanction
announcement date, and 0 otherwise.
LQPcurrent An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a contagion firm that shares at least one common partner with a
sanctioned firm during the current period but not during the fraud period and 0 otherwise.
LQPboth_periods An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a contagion firm that shares at least one common partner with a
sanctioned firm during the current period and also during the fraud period and 0 otherwise.
LQPreview An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a contagion firm that shares a review partner but not an
engagement partner with a sanctioned firm and 0 otherwise.
LQPengagement An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a contagion firm that shares an engagement partner but not a
review partner with a sanctioned firm and 0 otherwise.
LQPboth_partners An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is a contagion firm that shares both a review partner and
engagement partner with a sanctioned firm and 0 otherwise.
LQPpartnersanction An indicator variable that equals 1 if that specific partner was sanctioned for an accounting-related problem for all
years covering the sanction period and 0 otherwise.
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX B (continued)
Variable Definition
LQPfirmsanction An indicator variable that equals 1 if only the firm is sanctioned but not the LQP and 0 otherwise.
LQPfirst An indicator variable that equals 1 if a partner of contagion firms is identified as a low-quality partner for the first
time and 0 otherwise.
LQPnot first An indicator variable that equals 1 if a partner of contagion firms is not identified as a low-quality partner for the
first time and 0 otherwise.
LQPfemale An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP is female and 0 otherwise.
LQPmale An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP is male and 0 otherwise.
LQPold An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP’s age is above the sample median value and 0 otherwise.
LQPyoung An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP’s age is below the sample median value and 0 otherwise.
LQPparty An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP is a member of the Chinese Communist Party and 0 otherwise.
LQPnonparty An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP is not a member of the Chinese Communist Party and 0 otherwise.
LQPmaster An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP has a Master’s degree and 0 otherwise.
LQPnonmaster An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP does not have a Master’s degree and 0 otherwise.
LQPmajor An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP majored in accounting during university education and 0 otherwise.
LQPnonmajor An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP did not major in accounting during university education and 0
otherwise.
LQPmore_exp An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP’s number of years for conducting audits is above the sample
median value and 0 otherwise.
LQPless_exp An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP’s number of years for conducting audits is below the sample
median value and 0 otherwise.
LQPmoreclients An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP’s number of clients audited is above the sample median value and
0 otherwise.
LQPlessclients An indicator variable that equals 1 if the LQP’s number of clients audited is below the sample median value and
0 otherwise.
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